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Don't Act Like You Smell Pot! (At Least, Not in the Fourth
Circuit): Police-Created Exigent Circumstances in Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence*
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.1
INTRODUCTION
You are a police officer. You are called to an inner-city
apartment building to investigate a noise complaint and the smell of
marijuana.' As you approach the door of the specified apartment,
you hear music and smell burning marijuana.' You begin to knock on
the door, and you hear movement inside the apartment. Knocking
louder, you announce yourself as a police officer and your need to
investigate.4 The door is opened in response,5 and, after a moment of
conversation, you suspect the man in the doorway is holding a
* Copyright © 2009 by Katherine A. Carmon.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. The facts used in the example above are based on the facts set forth in United
States v. Mowatt, 513 F.3d 395, 397-98 (4th Cir. 2008). The Fourth Circuit rejected the
district court's conception of the exigent circumstances exception and concluded that the
district court should have granted Mowatt's motion to suppress the evidence seized in his
apartment. Id. at 400-03.
3. In Mowatt, the court noted that Officer Chick, one of the responding officers,
testified during the trial that he "smelled a combination of burning marijuana." Id. at 397
& n.1. Officer Chick apparently smelled the marijuana as he was identifying the
apartment specified in the complaint. Id. at 397.
4. In Mowatt, the officers heard not only movement inside the apartment but also
the discharging of an aerosol can, presumably some sort of air freshener to mask the smell
of marijuana. Id. The music was then turned down, and the officers announced
themselves in reply to the person in the apartment, asking who was at the door. Id. At
this point, the officers said, "It's the police. Open the door. We need to investigate
something." Id.
5. The Fourth Circuit held that, after the "knock-and-talk" attempt, Mowatt's
ultimate opening of the door was done "under the color of authority" and was not
consensual. Id. at 400 (quoting United States v. Conner, 127 F.3d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1997)).
This constituted a search that was not justified by exigent circumstances. Id. at 401. The
focus of this Recent Development, however, is the next argument considered by the
Fourth Circuit-whether the possible destruction of evidence justified the warrantless
entry. See id. at 401-03.
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weapon behind his back.6 After demanding that he show his hands,
he refuses. Concerned for your safety,7 you grab for his arm. A
struggle ensues, and you force your way into the apartment and
handcuff the man. After you quickly sweep through the apartment to
ensure no one else is there,8 you call for a search warrant so that you
may lawfully seize the loaded handgun in plain view as well as dozens
of pills scattered around the kitchen. Although you did not have a
warrant to enter in the first instance, you have relayed the facts of
your encounter with this man to a neutral magistrate who issues a
search warrant.9 You seize the gun and pills pursuant to the search
warrant.
At trial, the suspect moves to suppress the evidence against him
on the grounds that the gun and pills are fruits"° of an unlawful
search.11 After his motion is denied, he is convicted,12 but he appeals
the conviction. You again think through the events of that night-is
there a chance the appellate court will suppress the evidence taken
from the apartment?
6. The officers later determined that Mowatt did not have anything behind his back.
Id. at 397.
7. In Mowatt, the government did not argue that the exigent circumstance justifying
the officers' warrantless intrusion was the danger presented by the possibility that Mowatt
was holding a weapon behind his back. Id. at 401-03. The only argument presented to
show exigency was the possible destruction of evidence. Id.
8. For a full explanation of the permissible "protective sweep," see generally
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
9. The affidavit submitted in support of the warrant failed to describe how the
officers first identified themselves and then demanded Mowatt to open the door. Mowatt,
513 F.3d at 398. "As far as the application reflects, Mowatt's decision to open his door
could have been wholly voluntary." Id. at 405 n.10.
10. The use of the language "fruits" comes from the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine used in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. For further explanation of the "fruit
of the poisonous tree" doctrine, see generally the seminal case Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963).
11. The district court denied Mowatt's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from
his apartment. Mowatt, 513 F.3d at 399. The government argued and the district court
agreed that a warrant was unnecessary to enter Mowatt's apartment because, once
Mowatt realized the police were at his door, the real danger that Mowatt would destroy
evidence of the marijuana possession created an exigent circumstance that justified the
police entering. Id. Alternatively, the district court also accepted the government's
argument that a warrant was unnecessary because the police were only knocking on
Mowatt's door to resolve a noise complaint, not to investigate a drug crime. Id. The
inconsistency of the government's arguments did not go unnoticed by the Fourth Circuit.
See id. at 403 n.9 (putting the word exigency in quotation marks to emphasize the
inconsistent positions the government argued below).
12. Mowatt was convicted of possession of ecstasy with intent to distribute and three
different weapon possession offenses; he was sentenced to 197 months in prison. Id. at
399.
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You identified yourself as a police officer, but was that before or
after you smelled the marijuana? It matters. 3 Did you go to the
apartment that night only to investigate a noise complaint, or were
you aware that drugs might be found inside the apartment? In
determining whether an exigent circumstance excused you from
having a warrant, your awareness of the situation you were about to
encounter makes a difference. This "awareness" matters in two
contexts: (1) were you aware of what you may find after you entered
the dwelling, and if so, did that knowledge influence your decision to
announce yourself; and (2) were you aware of facts that would have
enabled a magistrate to issue a warrant upon finding probable
cause? 4 Whether your awareness matters in the warrant analysis will
depend upon which federal circuit governs your jurisdiction. The
only fact on which all circuits agree is that you, as a police officer,
may not create your own exigent circumstance to justify a warrantless
13. See United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). In
this case, officers were called to a motel to investigate a man who was allegedly in the
lobby with a gun. Id. Officers arrived, patted down the suspect, and found a revolver and
ammunition on his person. Id. Anthony Massey, the suspect, could not produce any
identification, but he told police that a man staying in room 523 could identify him. Id.
Officers proceeded to room 523, knocked on the door, and identified themselves as police
officers. Id. Once the occupants opened the door, police could smell marijuana coming
from the room. Id. The officers entered the room, found marijuana, and arrested the
room's occupants. Id. The Fourth Circuit affirmed appellant's convictions, holding the
police officers had a reasonable belief that the occupants would destroy the evidence, and
the officers did not create this exigency because they announced themselves before
smelling the marijuana. Id.
14. For a discussion of when this first type of awareness is lacking because an officer
did not expect an exigency to arise, see id. In Grissett, the court held the warrantless
search permissible, noting that "the officers could not have known in advance that their
conduct would precipitate an emergency involving the probable destruction of evidence."
Id. The court found it important that the officers were sent to room 523 to establish
Massey's identity, and there was no way they could have known drugs would be present.
Id. As such, there was no way of knowing that their presence would create a situation in
which the destruction of drugs was likely. Id. In terms of the second type of awareness,
see, for example, Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 12 (1948). In facts very similar to
Mowatt, a police officer was called to a motel room to investigate possible opium use. Id.
Upon smelling the opium and identifying the room from which the odor was coming, he
knocked on the door, identified himself as a police officer, and then searched the room.
Id. The Supreme Court held that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 15.
Because the police officer knew he was investigating a possible drug crime and then
smelled the opium for himself, the police officer was aware of facts that could be used to
obtain a warrant. Id. at 13. A neutral magistrate should make the decision whether a
search may be done, not a police officer. Id. at 14. Likewise, the existence of an exigency
alone will not be sufficient for a warrantless intrusion. The exigency must also be
accompanied by probable cause. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 721-22 (1983)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) ("The Court correctly observes that a warrant may be
dispensed with if the officer has probable cause and if some exception to the warrant
requirement, such as exigent circumstances, is applicable.").
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search."i How far you can go before you are considered to have
"created" an exigency, however, varies according to the circuit.
The preceding facts were based upon a recent Fourth Circuit
case, United States v. Mowatt,16  which held that no exigent
circumstances existed when police officers knocked on Mowatt's
door, demanded access, and subsequently entered without a
warrant.1 7 The Mowatt facts illustrate the significance of the small
details, circumstances, and police behavior that lead up to and
continue through warrantless, in-home searches.18 Although all
circuits agree that police officers may not create their own exigent
circumstances,19 circuit courts are split on exactly what standard to
use in evaluating whether a police officer has created her own
exigency. For police officers, this means that their behavior is
evaluated differently depending on which circuit governs their
jurisdiction. In Mowatt, the Fourth Circuit relied on the fact that the
officers became aware of the marijuana in the apartment before they
decided to announce themselves as police officers.2" Based on that
fact, the officers essentially circumvented the warrant requirement.21
By announcing themselves, they hoped the occupants would react by
destroying the evidence, which would allow the officers to enter the
apartment without a warrant to prevent the destruction of that
15. See, e.g., United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 370 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[I1n order to
determine whether the police impermissibly manufacture or create exigent circumstances,
we must look to the reasonableness and propriety of their actions and investigative tactics
preceding their warrantless entry."); United States v. Ojeda, 276 F.3d 486, 488 (9th Cir.
2002) ("Exigent circumstances created by improper conduct by the police may not be used
to justify a warrantless search."); United States v. Rico, 51 F.3d 495, 505 (5th Cir. 1995)
("[W]e will not second-guess law enforcement tactics as long as those tactics are neither
unreasonable nor employed with specific intent to create an emergency simply to
circumvent the warrant requirement.").
16. 513 F.3d 395 (4th Cir. 2008).
17. Id. at 401.
18. This Recent Development will focus on in-home warrantless searches and
excludes automobile and person searches taking place in public. Included in the in-home
category are places treated as homes under the law, such as a friend's house if one is an
overnight guest and hotel rooms. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-97 (1990)
(holding an overnight guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his host's home);
Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964) (finding defendant must give consent to
search his hotel room).
19. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
20. Mowatt, 513 F.3d at 402-03.
21. Scholars and judges alike debate whether the Fourth Amendment institutes a
"warrant requirement" or simply directs us to explore the "reasonableness" of the police
behavior. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS, III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
INVESTIGATING CRIME 174-76 (3d ed. 2006).
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evidence.22  Although the Fourth Circuit found these actions
impermissible, the Second Circuit likely would have reached the
23opposite outcome.
In light of the Mowatt decision, this Recent Development argues
that because the choices a police officer makes during an
investigation determine whether a court will suppress the evidence,
the Supreme Court should grant certiorari on such a case to ensure
that the Fourth Amendment's protections, especially regarding
exigent circumstances, are applied uniformly across jurisdictions.
Part I of this Recent Development will explore police-created exigent
circumstances by considering the exigent circumstances exception to
the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, specifically the
"destruction of evidence" exigency and how it is treated in each of the
circuit courts.24 Although it is important to note how differently the
circuit courts deal with the presence of this exigency, the focus of this
Recent Development is how police create their own exigency. At its
center, Part II will identify the existing circuit split over what
constitutes accepted criteria for determining whether police have
created their own exigent circumstance in order to circumvent the
warrant requirement. Part II will also discuss the policy
considerations inherent in these determinations. Finally, after calling
for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari, Part III will explore
subjective intent in Supreme Court precedent and propose a practical
objective standard encouraging uniformity and consistency among
circuits in identifying when a police officer has created her own
exigency.
I. START SIMPLE: A WARRANT IS (USUALLY) REQUIRED
A. The "Requirement"
A warrant guarantees that a neutral party has found probable
cause for the search and that the search is not the product of
overzealous police activity.' It is well established that a warrantless
22. Mowatt, 513 F.3d at 401-02.
23. See infra Part II.A.
24. In addressing the background material, it is important to note that each circuit's
inquiries and determinations are very fact specific. At the risk of over-treating the
individual decisions, central facts are laid out in text, with the accompanying secondary,
yet interesting, facts in the footnotes.
25. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) ("[The Fourth Amendment's]
protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime.").
2009]
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search of the home is unreasonable: "Freedom from intrusion into
the home or dwelling is the archetype of the privacy protection
secured by the Fourth Amendment. In general a home may not be
searched without a warrant notwithstanding probable cause. '"26
Despite the presumption of unreasonableness in warrantless searches,
the Supreme Court in Minnesota v. Olson2 7 identified several
categories of circumstances in which police would be justified in going
into a home without a warrant.28 The Court concluded that exigent
circumstances exist when (1) the police are in "hot pursuit" of a felon,
(2) the destruction of evidence is imminent, (3) there is a need to
prevent a suspect from escaping, or (4) there exists a risk of danger to
the policemen or persons inside or outside the dwelling.29
While the existence of the exigent circumstance exception means
that warrantless entries are permissible at times, courts will
"distinguish between cases where exigent circumstances arise
naturally during a delay in obtaining a warrant and those where
officers have deliberately created the exigent circumstances."30 If, on
the one hand, an exigent circumstance arises naturally while police
are in the process of obtaining a warrant, then police are justified in a
warrantless search.3' For example, in United States v. Campbell,32
police officers who observed a controlled drug buy were justified in
their warrantless search when the suspect unexpectedly removed the
package from the delivery location to his home, observed an
unrelated marked police car outside his home, and opened the altered
package immediately.33 The officers were so justified because they
"did not 'create' the various factors that converged to create the
exigent circumstances."34 On the other hand, police officers may not
26. Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
27. 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
28. Id. at 100 (approving the Minnesota Supreme Court's formulation of when exigent
circumstances for a warrantless intrusion exist).
29. Id. In Mowatt, the Fourth Circuit explicitly considered the police officers' claim of
exigency as falling into the second category of exigency, the imminent destruction of
evidence. United States v. Mowatt, 513 F.3d 395, 401-02 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding that the
officers were aware of the marijuana in the apartment before they "decided to alert
Mowatt of their presence .... By not [obtaining a warrant], they set up the wholly
foreseeable risk that the occupants, upon being notified of the officers' presence, would
seek to destroy the evidence of their crimes.").
30. United States v. Webster, 750 F.2d 307, 327 (5th Cir. 1984).
31. See id. at 326-27.
32. 2001 FED App. 0276P, 261 F.3d 628 (6th Cir.).
33. Id. at 8-10, 261 F.3d at 633-34.
34. Id. at 10, 261 F.3d at 634. The Sixth Circuit specifically refused to find that
officers altering the contents of a package had "created" the danger that the evidence
inside will be destroyed when the alteration is discovered. Id. Instead, the court noted
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create the exigency themselves in order to circumvent the warrant
requirement. For example, when the police are aware that persons
inside a dwelling house are using drugs, they cannot knock on the
door and announce themselves as police, thereby intentionally
creating a situation where the suspects would be motivated to try to
destroy the drugs and the police would have their reason, or
"exigency," for going in the house without a warrant."
Manufacturing an exigency is impermissible in all circuits, and
evidence obtained from the warrantless search will be suppressed.
3 6
The problem then becomes the variety of ways courts interpret
whether the destruction of evidence exigency exists.
B. Is There "Exigency"?
Although each circuit recognizes that the destruction of evidence
may justify a warrantless search, the courts take different approaches
when deciding whether the destruction of evidence exigency is
present.37  These approaches fall into three categories: (1) the
examine-avoid approach, (2) the uncritical approach, and (3) the
examine-only approach.38 In the examine-avoid category-the most
restrictive category,39 courts examine the facts of the case, hold
warrantless action suspect, and require the police to secure a warrant
that the unrelated police car and the suspect's sudden relocation made it reasonable for
the police to believe the evidence would be destroyed and that there was not time to
obtain a warrant. Id. at 10-11, 261 F.3d at 634.
35. Compare United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 362-64 (3d Cir. 2006) (concluding
that the police created their own exigency because they knew drugs were in the room
before they announced their presence), with United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778
(4th Cir. 1991) (concluding exigency existed because the police only smelled marijuana
after they knocked and announced themselves).
36. See United States v. Mowatt, 513 F.3d 395, 405 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding that the
district court erroneously denied Mowatt's suppression motion).
37. See generally Barbara C. Salken, Balancing Exigency and Privacy in Warrantless
Searches to Prevent Destruction of Evidence: The Need for a Rule, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 283
(1987) (exploring the circuit split in determining exigencies and proposing a uniform
standard).
38. See id. at 302. The three categories are Salken's own creation. In Salken's
groupings, the First, Third, and Fourth Circuits comprise the examine-avoid approach. Id.
at 303. The uncritical approach grouping is composed of the Sixth, Eighth, and District of
Columbia Circuits. Id. at 310-11. Finally, the examine-only approach is comprised of the
Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. Id. at 314. These are
Salken's original groupings of the circuits. However, more extensive analysis may reveal
that circuits have shifted since the time of Salken's publication.
39. Id. at 303.
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if possible in order to avoid such warrantless intrusions.4" Thus, these
courts are unlikely to condone warrantless police activity.41
The uncritical approach is the second method courts use for
analyzing the existence of the destruction of evidence exigency.42
These courts only inquire into whether the police had a reasonable
belief that an exigency existed; they do not consider the time it would
have taken to get a warrant or alternative avenues that the police
could have explored instead of forging ahead with a warrantless
search of a suspect's home.43 These courts defer to police work and
choose not to second-guess a police officer's reasonable belief that
exigency exists.'
40. Id. The Third Circuit adopted the examine-avoid standard in United States v.
Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1973). Rubin identifies several factors for analyzing the
existence of exigent circumstances, some of which include "the degree of urgency
involved," the officer's "reasonable belief that contraband is about to be removed," and
"the ready destructibility of the contraband." Id. at 268. The Fourth Circuit also adopted
the Rubin standard. See United States v. Turner, 650 F.2d 526, 528 (4th Cir. 1981)
(holding police were justified in warrantless entry of home because Rubin factors
evidenced an exigency existed). In a similarly restrictive fashion, the First Circuit
conducts an inquiry into exactly when the police had probable cause and how long the
police waited to get a warrant after obtaining probable cause. See United States v.
Samboy, 433 F.3d 154, 159 (1st Cir. 2005) ("First, at what time did the police finally have
probable cause to search Samboy's apartment? Second, were the police justified in
waiting as long as they did in obtaining a warrant after obtaining probable cause?"). The
First Circuit mandates the government prove the existence of exigent circumstances by
"particularized, case-specific facts," holding the police to a strict standard of compliance
with probable cause and a strict standard of proving that a warrantless intrusion was
justified. Id. at 158 (quoting United States v. Hidalgo, 747 F. Supp. 818, 828 (D. Mass.
1990)).
41. Salken, supra note 37, at 311.
42. Id. at 311-12.
43. See United States v. Valencia, 499 F.3d 813, 816 (8th Cir. 2007) ("[W]e evaluate
the constitutionality of the search by looking only to whether [the police] 'had an
objectively reasonable basis for believing' that exigent circumstances necessitated
warrantless entry into the apartment." (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 406
(2006))); Causey v. City of Bay City, 2006 FED App. 0112P, 4, 442 F.3d 524, 529 (6th Cir.)
(finding the officers' belief reasonable that exigency existed when the officers were able to
confirm gunfire at the residence, that no one had left the residence, and that no one was
answering the door); United States v. Socey, 846 F.2d 1439, 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("[The
government] contends that the lower court improperly required [them] to prove that the
occupants in the Socey house were aware of the police presence ... and that the suspects
were attempting to dispose of contraband. We agree [with the government]. As noted,
the police must have an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the destruction of
evidence is imminent.").
44. But see United States v. Duchi, 906 F.2d 1278, 1282-84 (8th Cir. 1990) (examining
the nature of the police investigation and the tactics used). In Duchi, UPS called police to
investigate an undeliverable package, and the police determined the package contained
cocaine. Id. at 1279. The police replaced one cocaine brick with a book. Id. at 1280.
Meanwhile, the police placed the suspects' home and place of work under surveillance. Id.
Several hours after surveillance began, one of the suspects retrieved the package from
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The last approach, the examine-only approach, is the most
common.45 This third category falls in the middle of the previous
categories-not quite as restrictive as the examine-avoid approach
but not as loose as the uncritical approach.46 This seems to be a catch-
all category, and the circuits in this group determine exigency in
varied ways. Most courts in this category adhere to a "totality of the
circumstances" standard.47 The courts assess the urgency of the
officer's need,48 but they make no mention of avoiding warrantless
intrusions at all costs, like the examine-avoid circuits.
49 Existing
UPS. Id. Approximately thirty minutes after pick-up, police entered the suspects' home
without a warrant and found the package unopened on the dining room table. Id. The
government claimed exigency, justifying the officer's entry, existed once the suspect
returned home with the altered package because the alterations would alert the suspects
of the investigation and trigger destruction of the evidence. Id. The court was not
persuaded. Id. at 1282. Instead, the court inquired into the length of time since the police
had focused their investigation on the suspect, nearly six hours. Id. at 1282-83. The court
ultimately dismissed the government's exigency argument because that result was exactly
what the police intended. Id. at 1284. Viewing this case alone, it would seem that the
Eighth Circuit belongs in the examine-avoid category, the most restrictive category. See
supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. However, this case seems to be an anomaly
among a myriad of Eighth Circuit cases that simply inquire into the reasonableness of the
officer's objective belief. See, e.g., United States v. Hogan, 539 F.3d 916, 922 (8th Cir.
2008) (finding exigent circumstances existed when participant in a drug deal made "eye
contact" with the police officers and then fled, thus giving officers a reasonable fear for
both their safety and the destruction of evidence); United States v. Leveringston, 397 F.3d
1112, 1116 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying "an objective standard to evaluate the reasonableness
of an assertion that exigent circumstances justified a warrantless entry").
45. Six circuits fall into this category. Salken, supra note 37, at 314. This category
demands a critical evaluation of police claims of exigency; however, it does not require
that police "avoid warrantless action by planning." Id. It is worth noting that one court in
this group, the Seventh Circuit, may be shifting from the examine-only category into the
uncritical category. See United States v. Bell, 500 F.3d 609, 614 (7th Cir. 2007). In Bell,
the court dismissed the petitioner's argument concerning the time frame between his
arrest and the search of a locked safe in his motel room. Id. at 613-14. Petitioner argued
that police had time to obtain a warrant in the four hours between his arrest and the
search of his hotel room. Id. at 614. The court said only, "[t]he question as to whether
exigent circumstances exist is viewed through the eyes of a reasonable police officer." Id.
at 613. The court's dismissal of petitioner's argument that no exigency existed may have
been motivated in part by the circumstances of the investigation: a kidnapped man was
being held for ransom, threats had been made on his life during the ransom period, and
the police had little time to attempt to save the victim. Id. at 610, 612.
46. Bell, 500 F.3d at 612.
47. United States v. Maldanado, 472 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2006) ("When
determining whether an exigency exists, we look at the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the officers' actions.").
48. Moore v. Andreno, 505 F.3d 203, 213 (2d Cir. 2007) (using factors such as whether
the suspect is armed, the probability that the suspect will escape, and the peaceful
circumstances of the entry to determine how urgent the officers' need was to act without a
warrant).
49. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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scholarship has thoroughly explored this circuit split, focusing on the
broader context of the destruction of evidence exigency.5 ° The
narrower issue, and the focus of this Recent Development, centers on
the circuit split of determining when police officers have
manufactured their own exigency.
II. NARROWING THE Focus: THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE
EXISTENCE OF POLICE-CREATED EXIGENCY
On the narrow issue of whether an officer has created her own
exigency, the circuits are split into two camps: (1) the objective
inquiry used by the Second Circuit; and (2) the subjective inquiry
used by all other circuits, evidenced here by the Fifth Circuit. The
Second Circuit reasons that "[t]he fact that the suspects may
reasonably be expected to behave illegally does not prevent law
enforcement agents from acting lawfully to afford the suspects the
opportunity to do so.'' Objectively, so long as the police act within
the bounds of the law, no impermissible exigency is created. Delving
deeper, the Fifth Circuit explores the officer's actions and whether
they were taken with "bad faith intent to avoid the warrant
requirement. 5 2 Even if the actions were not in bad faith, the court
considers "whether [the officers'] actions creating the exigency were
sufficiently unreasonable or improper as to preclude dispensation
with the warrant requirement."53 Each inquiry will be fully explored
below.
Before moving to the circuit split, it is worth noting why this
inquiry is not governed by the Supreme Court case Johnson v. United
50. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
51. United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 771 (2d Cir. 1990) (en banc). For a
discussion of the MacDonald decision and its effect on Fourth Amendment protections,
see generally Amy B. Belier, United States v. MacDonald: The Exigent Circumstances
Exception and the Erosion of the Fourth Amendment, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 407 (1991).
52. United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 590 (5th Cir. 2004).
53. Id. Both the Sixth and Eighth Circuits have adopted the reasonableness inquiry in
the examination of police behavior and circumstances preceding the exigency. Compare
United States v. Chambers, 2005 FED App. 0045P, 4-5, 395 F.3d 563, 568 (6th Cir.)
(evaluating police knowledge, which included surveillance data and informant tips, and
concluding the police created their own exigency when they knocked on the suspect's door
before seeking a warrant), and United States v. Duchi, 906 F.2d 1278, 1285 (8th Cir. 1990)
(concluding police created their own exigency when they altered the package's contents in
a way that would alert the defendant to the investigation), with MacDonald, 916 F.2d at
772 (rejecting the suggestion that "a district court in reaching a determination about
exigent circumstances should attribute any significance to the subjective state of mind of
law enforcement agents. As previously mentioned, we have repeatedly held that the
determination of exigent circumstances is an objective one ....").
[Vol. 87
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States.54 In resolving Mowatt, the Fourth Circuit relied heavily on the
Johnson decision.55 The Johnson decision, however, did not deal with
police-created exigency. 6 In Johnson, the Supreme Court noted that,
at the time the police demanded entry, they possessed enough
evidence for a magistrate to make a probable cause determination;
thus, the police should not have made that determination
themselves. 7 Furthermore, the Court found that no evidence was at
risk of being destroyed and held that dissipating fumes will never
suffice as an exigency to justify a warrantless search.
8  Because
Johnson never reached the question of police-created exigency, it
does not govern this issue, and the circuits are left to their differing
standards to determine when police in fact create their own exigent
circumstances.
A. Objective: The Second Circuit
An examination of Second Circuit jurisprudence reveals that this
circuit allows police officers more discretion in circumventing the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. 9 In adopting a more
objective analysis, the Second Circuit rejects a subjective inquiry into
the beliefs of the officer and instead looks to the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the officer.' So long as the officer's
conduct is lawful, the officer cannot create an impermissible exigent
54. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
55. See United States v. Mowatt, 513 F.3d 395, 401 (4th Cir. 2008) ("We see no basis
for distinguishing Johnson from the case at bar.").
56. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13-15. The Fourth Circuit even distinguishes its analysis
from the Johnson decision on the point of the officer's subjective intention: "Nothing in
Johnson, however, suggests that the result there depended on the subjective intentions of
the officers at the time they gained access to the hotel or even indicates that the Court
determined what those intentions were." Mowatt, 513 F.3d. at 401. Thus, the Johnson
decision never addressed whether the police created the exigency; the Supreme Court
concluded the search was impermissible without reaching the question of whether the
officers created their own exigency. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14-15.
57. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14 ("When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the
right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or
government enforcement agent.").
58. Id. at 15 ("The evidence of [the fumes'] existence before the search was adequate
and the testimony of the officers to that effect would not perish from the delay of getting a
warrant.").
59. Other circuits have commented that the Second Circuit allows for greater latitude
in dispensing with the warrant requirement. See United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 369
(3d Cir. 2006). Adding to the commentary, the Third Circuit distinguishes the Second
Circuit's approach from the approach of other circuits: "Contrary to the Fifth Circuit, the
reasonableness of police investigative tactics precipitating the exigency does not seem to
figure into the Second Circuit's analysis." Id.
60. See United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 772 (2d Cir. 1990) (en banc).
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circumstance.61  As the court reasoned in United States v.
MacDonald,62 "[f]aw enforcement agents are required to be innocent
but not naive."63 MacDonald is the Second Circuit's seminal exigency
case; although nearly twenty years old, the case's logic is still cited
favorably today. 64
In MacDonald, a police task force began surveillance of a
Manhattan apartment building after they learned some of the
residents were possibly running a drug operation inside the building.65
After purchasing marijuana with a prerecorded bill,66 the undercover
agent returned to the Task Force to report his observations.67 Ten
minutes later, the undercover agent, along with other agents, returned
to the apartment, knocked on the door, and identified themselves.68
The agents heard "shuffling feet" inside and also received a radio
transmission that the occupants of the apartment were escaping
through a back window.69 The agents subsequently used a battering
ram to force entry, arrested the occupants of the apartment, and
seized the guns and drugs in plain view.70 MacDonald appealed his
subsequent conviction, alleging the district court erred in admitting
the evidence seized from the apartment.
In an en banc decision, the Second Circuit found the agents'
conduct to be lawful and that exigent circumstances-not ones of the
61. See id.
62. 916 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1990) (en banc).
63. Id. at 772.
64. See, e.g., United States v. Klump, 536 F.3d 113, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2008) (relying on
MacDonald for the proposition that the determination of exigency is an objective one,
centering on the totality of the circumstances facing the officer); United States v. Brown,
52 F.3d 415, 422 (2d Cir. 1995) (same).
65. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 768. The court mentions, but makes no issue of, the fact
that the Task Force was informed of this operation in May yet did not set up surveillance
on the apartment building until September. Id.
66. For a civilian-friendly explanation of "prerecorded bill," see DAVID FEIGE,
INDEFENSIBLE 215 (2006) ("[Prerecorded money is] really just a bunch of regular fives,
tens, and twenties that are Xeroxed before a [controlled] buy. The point is to record the
serial numbers of the bills ....").
67. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 768. Specifically, the undercover agent saw a man who
was pointing a semi-automatic weapon at the floor, another man who was in easy reach of
a .357 caliber revolver, and the agent also smelled the "distinct odor of marijuana smoke."
Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. Several agents remained outside the building and were able to observe the
occupants who were attempting to escape through a bathroom window. Id. Ironically
enough, the only man to successfully escape was the man who sold marijuana to the
undercover agent. Id.
70. Id. Specifically, two loaded weapons, several thousand dollars, and large
quantities of both cocaine and marijuana, along with drug paraphernalia and packaging
materials, were seized. Id.
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agents' own creation-justified the warrantless entry.71 By knocking
and announcing themselves as law enforcement, the agents had acted
in accordance with the requirement of notice before forced entry.72
After observing the guns and drugs in the apartment via an
undercover agent, the agents had information sufficient for a neutral
magistrate to find probable cause and issue a warrant. They also had
ample time to secure a warrant. Instead of securing that warrant, the
agents chose to proceed without one on their own knowledge.
Acknowledging that the "exigency was intensified when, ten minutes
after the controlled buy, law enforcement agents knocked on the
apartment door and announced themselves[,]" 73 the court here
admitted that the agents' own conduct caused the scrambling inside
and, thus, led to the attempted destruction of evidence.74 The court
refused, however, to hold that the agents manufactured the exigency,
turning their analysis on the simple point that the agents' knock and
announcement was lawful.75
According to the Second Circuit, the agents' actions were lawful
because they complied with the notice requirement before forcing
entry.76 The court reasoned that it does not matter if the agents "may
be 'interested' in having the occupants react in a way that provides
exigent circumstances."77 In fact, if an officer expects a suspect will
act unlawfully, the officer may act in a way that encourages the
71. Id. at 773. In deciding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry,
the court considered these ten factors:
(1) the grave nature of the ongoing crimes; (2) the presence of loaded weapons; (3)
a likelihood that the suspects were themselves using narcotics; (4) a clear and
immediate threat of danger to law enforcement agents and to the public at large;
(5) not only more than the minimum probable cause to believe, but actual
knowledge, that the suspect committed the crime; (6) at least strong reason to
believe the suspects were on the premises; (7) a likelihood turned to reality that a
suspect might escape if not quickly apprehended; (8) an urgent need to prevent the
loss of evidence; (9) the additional time required to obtain a warrant at the late
hour of day; and (10) an attempt by the agents to enter peacefully.
Id.
72. Id. at 771; see also Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en
banc) (including peaceable entry as a consideration in the exigent circumstance analysis).
73. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 770-71.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 771.
76. Id. For a discussion of the notice requirement, see generally Miller v. United
States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
77. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 772. The Second Circuit refused to look into the officers'
minds at the time of the exigency. Id. at 771-72. Instead, the court examined only the
objective behaviors of the officers and whether these behaviors were lawful. Id. at 771.
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suspect's unlawful behavior.78 So long as the agents' actions are
lawful, they do. not impermissibly manufacture their own exigency.79
The MacDonald court goes so far to say that, even if there were no
exigent circumstances before the knock, the agents did not
impermissibly create the circumstances justifying a warrantless
entry.8"
Consider for a moment the facts presented in the introductory
hypothetical based on United States v. Mowatt.1 If Mowatt had lived
in the Second Circuit's jurisdiction rather than the Fourth Circuit's,
the outcome would probably have been very different-Mowatt
would not have been able to suppress the evidence found in his
apartment. Most likely, the Second Circuit would have held that the
officers' acts were lawful and, as a result, the officers did not
impermissibly create their own exigency. In Mowatt, the officers were
called to investigate a noise complaint and the smell of marijuana;
once they identified the specific apartment, they knocked and
announced themselves. 2 The officers in Mowatt followed the knock-
and-announce rule that the MacDonald court relied on to justify the
lawfulness of the agents' conduct.83 Upon hearing the movement and
discharge of an aerosol can in Mowatt's apartment-analogous to the
"shuffling feet" in MacDonald-the police could seemingly enter
Mowatt's apartment without a warrant, justified by the urgent need to
preserve evidence.84 Under the Second Circuit's objective standard,
the police may use lawful conduct to allow Mowatt the opportunity to
78. Id. at 771 ("Exigent circumstances are not to be disregarded simply because the
suspects chose to respond to the agents' lawful conduct by attempting to escape, destroy
evidence, or engage in any other unlawful activity.").
79. Id. at 772 ("[W]e hold that when law enforcement agents act in an entirely lawful
manner, they do not impermissibly create exigent circumstances.").
80. Id. at 771.
81. 513 F.3d 395 (4th Cir. 2008); see also supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text.
82. Mowatt, 513 F.3d at 397.
83. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. In Mowatt, the Fourth Circuit held that,
when the officers announced themselves and demanded that Mowatt open the door, the
subsequent opening of the door was an impermissible search. Mowatt, 513 F.3d at 400.
The officers' demand, under the color of authority, negated any argument of consent the
government put forth. Id. However, pursuant to the MacDonald decision, the police in
Mowatt seemingly could have barged in when they heard "shuffling feet" and the sound of
an aerosol can being sprayed as such noise would have indicated the possible destruction
of evidence. See supra note 4.
84. In MacDonald, the evidence the police needed to preserve was the prerecorded
bill used in the undercover transaction for marijuana. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 770.
Apparently, the agents were concerned that the bill might be used in another transaction
or otherwise taken out of the apartment in the ten minutes between the undercover
transaction and the warrantless entry. Id.
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act in a way that gives rise to an exigency, namely the possible
destruction of evidence.85
What good is achieved through this standard? Admittedly
uncritical of and deferential to police conduct, this standard allows
the police more freedom in their behaviors. Presumably, less
evidence would be excluded because fewer intrusions would be
deemed to violate the Fourth Amendment.86 In a similar vein, this
objective standard also seems easier to govern and might offer more
uniform protection of Fourth Amendment rights, as courts are not
forced to look into the mind of the searching officers. Instead of
sparring over hypothetical motives, the officers' actions will be
examined at face value.
B. Subjective: The Fifth Circuit (and Everyone Else)
Most circuits use a subjective test87 to analyze whether police
have created their own exigent circumstances. This approach has two
levels of inquiry. The first asks whether the circumstances giving rise
to the exigency were deliberately created by the police with "the bad
faith intent to avoid the warrant requirement."88 Second, the court
will ask, notwithstanding bad faith intent, if the actions taken by the
police in creating the exigency were unreasonable.89
In United States v. Richard," the Fifth Circuit used the subjective
test to determine whether police created their own exigency.9' In
85. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
86. For a full discussion of the merits of the exclusionary rule, see 1 JOSHUA
DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 379-83
(4th ed. 2006).
87. The approach taken by the Fifth Circuit is labeled the "subjective test" because it
contains a subjective component, namely the "bad faith" inquiry. See infra note 88 and
accompanying text. In general, circuits using this standard look to the officers' actions and
ask if they were done intentionally to avoid the warrant requirement. See United States v.
Duchi, 906 F.2d 1278, 1284 (8th Cir. 1990). Courts will also consider what information the
officers knew when approaching the suspect's door. See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-
Guerra, 788 F.2d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 1986).
88. United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 368 n.11 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting United
States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 590 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc)).
89. Id.
90. 994 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1993).
91. Id. at 248-50. The Richard decision, although fifteen-years-old, is still heavily
cited for its discussion of exigent circumstances. See United States v. Fabian, 220 F. App'x
340, 342 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Richard for the proposition that police-created exigent
circumstances "will not pass Fourth Amendment muster"); United States v. Chambers,
2005 FED App. 0045P, 3, 395 F.3d 563, 566 (6th Cir.) ("Richard stand[s] firmly for the
proposition that warrantless searches are not permitted when the only exigency is one that
is of the officer's creation.").
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Richard, federal agents had received a tip that a boat would arrive in
one of Louisiana's ports with drugs attached to the hull.92 After
surveilling the port and identifying the boat in question, federal
agents spotted a van parked in the area.93 Around 6:00 a.m. the next
morning, agents observed a man going from the port to the van and
subsequently pulled him over and searched the van.94 Inside the van,
the agents found a card in the name of Dani Gonzalez and a beeper
with the number of the Superdome Motor Inn in New Orleans locked
into the device." Upon further investigation, the agents ascertained
that a man named Johnny was staying in Room 214 of the Inn and
that Johnny was involved with trafficking drugs.96 At this point, the
agents called for backup and drove to the Superdome Motor Inn.97
They reached the Inn at 9:00 a.m.98
The agents, after speaking with the clerks of the motel and
confirming that two men were staying in Room 214, went to the room
and knocked on the door.99 After announcing that they were police
officers, the agents heard people talking, movement in the room, and
drawers slamming. 1°° At this point, the agents kicked in the door and
entered the room. 01 A .45 caliber pistol was recovered from one of
the occupants of the room.0 2 The trial court suppressed the evidence
found in the motel room, and the government appealed.'03
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding
that the agents had impermissibly created the exigent circumstances,
so the exigency could not justify their warrantless entry. °4 In holding
that the exigent circumstances did not arise until the agents knocked
and announced themselves, the court reasoned that the police could
92. Richard, 994 F.2d at 246.
93. Id. The van contained a diving tank and a VHF marine radio, apparently alerting
the surveilling agents to the possibility that the van and the boat were linked. Id.
94. Id. The man in the van was defendant Richard, who was wearing a diving suit. Id.
95. Id. The agents had previously suspected Gonzalez of involvement in the
smuggling of marijuana. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. This fact is relevant to the inquiry of whether the agents had time to secure a
warrant. From the facts listed above, Richard was arrested and searched at 6:00 a.m.,
three hours before the agents arrived at the Superdome Motor Inn.
99. Id at 246-47.
100. Id. at 247. The facts indicate that the agents heard the occupants respond "Okay.
Okay. Wait a minute." Id. However, the door did not open immediately, and it was then




104. Id. at 249-50.
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have secured the hotel room undetected and delayed their entry until
they could obtain a warrant."' "Instead, the warrantless entry
became a foregone conclusion once officers knocked. 10 6 Because the
government failed to show that the occupants of Room 214 were
destroying evidence, or even that they were suspicious because of
Richard's absence, the government's arguments were "pure
speculation" and could not be used to justify the warrantless
intrusion. 7 Although the court did not find specifically that the
agents acted in bad faith, the court found that the officers acted
unreasonably because they had time to obtain a warrant.' 8 The court
noted that the agents had three hours to secure a warrant and that, if
these hours were not enough, the police could have secured the
outside of the motel room while a warrant was obtained.' 9 It was the
agents' activity-namely the knocking and announcing-that gave
rise to the exigent circumstances, and thus, the warrantless entry did
not pass Fourth Amendment muster.110
Given the circuit split on police-created exigency, the range of
behavior a court will conclude is permissible varies greatly according
to the circuit in which one finds herself. Unlike the Second Circuit,
the Fifth Circuit will not allow law enforcement agents to announce
themselves, all the while expecting the room's occupants to respond
by attempting to destroy the evidence contained therein, and then
enter the premises to stop that destruction without a warrant.''
MacDonald demonstrates the Second Circuit's willingness to defer to
police conduct regardless of whether that conduct was intended to
105. Id. at 249.
106. Id.; see also United States v. Munoz-Guerra, 788 F.2d 295, 298-99 (5th Cir. 1986)
(concluding the officers warrantless entry was inexcusable because no exigency justified
the officers' approach of defendant's patio). The Richard court agreed that, like Munoz-
Guerra, there was no justification here for approaching the suspects because no exigent
circumstances existed. Richard, 994 F.2d at 249.
107. Richard, 994 F.2d at 249. The government advanced the argument that the two
men in the room could have been tipped off by a phone call or by the lone fact that
Richard did not return. Id. However, the court seemed unwilling to allow the police to




110. Id. at 249-50. But see United States v. Rico, 51 F.3d 495, 504 (5th Cir. 1995)
(holding that the police did not impermissibly create their own exigency by abandoning
their undetected surveillance to arrest a man driving a vehicle right in front of the house
they were surveilling).
111. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
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bring about the possible destruction of evidence and, thus, provided
the exigency to enter without a warrant.
'1 2
The Fifth Circuit explicitly rejected the government's reliance on
MacDonald and its argument that the possibility of the destruction of
evidence justified the officers' warrantless entry,"3 concluding
"MacDonald is inapposite."1 4  The Fifth Circuit distinguished
MacDonald, noting that the Second Circuit found exigent
circumstances existed before the knock-and-announce and the
occupants then responded to the lawful knock with an escape attempt
that further justified the officers' entrance. ' By contrast, in Richard,
the exigencies did not arise until the police announced themselves.
11 6
In distinguishing Richard from MacDonald, however, the Fifth
Circuit ignored this very important statement by the Second Circuit:
"[A]ssuming arguendo that there were no exigent circumstances
before the knock, the agents' conduct did not impermissibly create
the circumstances occurring thereafter."' 17 Thus, the two cases cannot
fully be distinguished based on when the exigent circumstances arose.
Assuming (as the Second Circuit did) that in both cases no exigent
circumstances existed until police officers knocked and announced,
the Fifth Circuit found that knock impermissible while the Second
Circuit did not. The different outcomes can be attributed to the type
of analysis the circuit uses; the Fifth Circuit inquires into the officers'
intentions while the Second Circuit only looks objectively at whether
the officers' conduct was lawful.118
112. The MacDonald majority relied on the Supreme Court's "reject[ion of] the
inadvertence requirement for a valid plain view seizure" in Horton v. California for
support. United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 772 (2d Cir. 1990) (en banc) (" 'The
fact that an officer is interested in an item of evidence and fully expects to find it in the
course of a search should not invalidate its seizure if the search is confined in area and
duration by the terms of a warrant or a valid exception to the warrant requirement.' "
(quoting Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990))); see also United States v. Coles,
437 F.3d 361, 373 (3d Cir. 2006) (Roth, J., dissenting) ("In contrast [to the Third Circuit],
the Second Circuit, whose precedent, I believe, is more consistent with our Circuit's in this
area, relies on an objective test .... In this regard, the Second Circuit's focus is truer to
Supreme Court precedent." (internal citations omitted)).




117. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 771.
118. As evidence of the subjective inquiry, the Fifth Circuit established that the police
officers did not think they had enough evidence for a magistrate to find probable cause, so
they did not seek a warrant. Richard, 994 F.2d at 248. In fact, the court explicitly noted
that the officers' supervisor said "the agents intended to enter the room one way or




In determining how best to craft a compromise among the
circuits, it is informative to consider how the Supreme Court has
treated subjective inquiries in other contexts. The subjective intent of
police officers is irrelevant in cases concerning automobile stops,
compliance with statutes, and Miranda warnings.19 The Supreme
Court rejected such inquiries into the minds of police officers because
of the evidentiary difficulty in establishing subjective intent. l 0 Even a
"good faith" inquiry is not a subjective one; the Court has taken pains
to objectify the "good faith" exception to the warrant requirement.
121
The Supreme Court has stated that "sending state and federal courts
on an expedition into the minds of police officers would produce a
grave and fruitless misallocation of judicial resources.
' 122
Judging from precedent, it seems that the Supreme Court will
not be receptive to a subjective inquiry into the minds of police
officers when determining whether the officers manufactured their
own exigent circumstance. This rejection stems from the difficulty in
ascertaining officer motives as well as the reluctance to center Fourth
Amendment "reasonableness" on anything but objective
measurements. As it stands now, however, the Fifth Circuit and its
followers use a subjective inquiry when determining police-created
exigency while the Second Circuit conducts a purely objective inquiry.
The Supreme Court should identify one standard for determining
119. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 623 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(agreeing with the plurality's decision not to consider the subjective intent of the
interrogating officer and instead to formulate an objective test); Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding that the actual motivations of individual officers do not
affect the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S.
128, 136-38 (1978) (rejecting a "good faith" exception for statutory compliance, instead
focusing the inquiry on the police officers' actions, not their motives).
120. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813-14.
121. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 n.20 (1984) ("We emphasize that the
standard of reasonableness we adopt is an objective one. Many objections to a good-faith
exception assume that the exception will turn on the subjective good faith of individual
officers.").
122. Id. at 922 n.23 (quoting Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 565 (1968) (White,
J., dissenting)). The Supreme Court, however, has used a subjective inquiry outside the
police officer context. In California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), the Court allowed for
a subjective inquiry into the minds of individuals when considering the expectation of
privacy. Id. at 211-12. In determining whether the respondent had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his fenced-in but uncovered marijuana garden, the Court found
that he "has met the test of manifesting his own subjective intent and desire to maintain
privacy as to his unlawful agricultural pursuits." Id. at 211. Although this does not end
the inquiry, clearly one prong is the manifestation of the individual's subjective intent to
preserve privacy.
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when a law enforcement officer creates his own exigency to eliminate
such varied interpretations of the Fourth Amendment.'23 The Fourth
Amendment should be interpreted the same way in New York and
Louisiana, and law enforcement should strive for uniformity across
jurisdictions. Keeping in mind the Supreme Court's distaste for
subjective inquiries into the minds of police officers, a compromise is
suggested below.
In examining the preceding circuit split, both the objective and
subjective standards have their respective merits. The Second
Circuit, in making clear that lawful behavior does not impermissibly
manufacture exigency, also assumes that unlawful behavior will be
impermissible.'24  This premise should remain. As with the
exclusionary rule, the impermissibility of unlawful conduct
circumscribes police behavior and better protects citizens'
constitutional rights.'25 The problem with all lawful conduct being
permissible, subjective intent notwithstanding, is its inherent
deceptiveness. Unless a court inquires into the officer's motivation,
the court will always consider lawful conduct to be benign. Arguably,
behaviors undertaken in "bad faith" are not benign. Considering the
Fifth Circuit's standard, there exists obvious difficulty in ascertaining
someone's subjective intentions. Subjective intentions are only
measurable through their outward expression.
In order to strike a compromise, the standard should be an
objective one that inquires into the officer's awareness as measured
123. This is not, however, the first call for certiorari on a circuit split regarding a
subjective inquiry. The Petitioner's Brief in United States v. Zukas called for the Supreme
Court to grant certiorari to determine the significance of an officer's subjective intent in
evaluating whether an arrest has occurred. Brief of Petitioner on Jurisdiction at 8, Zukas
v. United States, 490 U.S. 1019 (1989) (No. 88-291). Although certiorari was ultimately
denied, Zukas v. United States, 490 U.S. 1019 (1989), the brief highlighted the differing
standards the circuits used to evaluate when a police officer makes a de facto arrest. Brief
of Petitioner on Jurisdiction, supra, at 10-11. The varying standards allowed for very
different police conduct when making arrests, wholly dependent on the jurisdiction.
Compare United States v. Lueck, 678 F.2d 895, 900 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding the subjective
intent of the officer is a factor to be considered in determining whether a custodial
interrogation occurred), with United States v. Beck, 598 F.2d 497, 500 (9th Cir. 1979)
(stating that the subjective intent of the officer has no place in determining whether an
arrest has occurred). These differing standards are just another example of a question that
must be answered by the Supreme Court so that police behavior will be examined
uniformly across jurisdictions.
124. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
125. For a discussion of the exclusionary rule and police behavior, see generally
Bradley Canon, Exclusionary Rule: Have Critics Proven That It Doesn't Deter Police, 62
JUDICATURE 398 (1978-79), and Yale Kamisar, In Defense of the Search and Seizure
Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 119 (2003).
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by tangible evidence. The facts the officer is aware of should be
presumed to inform his intentions. For example, if an officer is aware
that he will be investigating a possible drug crime, it will be presumed
that his intentions are to capture that evidence by the least
cumbersome avenue possible. Consider the Mowatt fact pattern. The
Fourth Circuit only briefly notes that the complaining phone call also
mentioned the smell of burning marijuana. 2 6  More emphasis is
placed upon the officer smelling the marijuana once arriving and his
then (supposed) belief that marijuana would be found in the
apartment. 127 The complaining phone call is an objective measure as
to what the officer was aware of at the time of dispatch. At that
moment, the officer knew that drugs might be found on the premises.
Although an uncorroborated complaint is not sufficient for a
probable cause issuance of a warrant, 128 the officer is on notice that
drugs may be present. Upon arrival to the specified premises, the
officer may then take into account any corroborating information-
loud music coming from the apartment, location in a "high crime
area,"'129 or, as in Mowatt, the smell of marijuana. Armed with these
facts, the officer must then call and request a telephone warrant.13°
The officer can then place the apartment under surveillance until the
warrant is approved. The officer could knock and announce himself
126. See supra notes 3, 11 and accompanying text.
127. Id.
128. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 227 (1983).
129. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (noting that a suspect's presence
in a "high crime area" is a relevant, though not determinative, factor when an officer
considers whether reasonable suspicion exists to justify stopping the suspect). For a
discussion of how flight in a high-crime area may be a reaction to hostile and abusive
governmental presence, rather than indicative of criminal activity, see Lenese C. Herbert,
Can't You See What I'm Saying? Making Expressive Conduct a Crime in High-Crime
Areas, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 135 (2002).
130. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2). In pertinent part, the Rule provides that a federal
magistrate may issue a warrant based on oral testimony communicated by telephone.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2)(A). The person requesting the warrant prepares a document
which will serve as the duplicate warrant and shall read that document over the phone to
the magistrate. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2)(B). The magistrate will then copy the
document verbatim, and the magistrate's copy serves as the original warrant. Id. In the
Mowatt case, a telephone warrant would have allowed the police officers to stay on the
premises, relay their information, and then use a warrant to enter and arrest Mowatt. The
Tenth Circuit requires that trial courts consider the availability of a telephone warrant in
determining whether exigent circumstances existed. See United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d
582, 589 (10th Cir. 1983). The Tenth Circuit encourages police officers to procure
telephone warrants where "the existence of exigent circumstances is a close question and
the police might otherwise conduct a warrantless search." Id. at 588 (quoting United
States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). The Tenth Circuit, however,
has refused to extend this analysis to cover the conduct of state officials. See United States
v. Chavez, 812 F.2d 1295, 1300-01 (10th Cir. 1987).
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and his need to speak with someone, but in the event that someone
opens the door and the smell of marijuana emanates from inside, this
lawful police behavior cannot then be used to justify a warrantless
entry into the home. Through the objective measure of the
complaining phone call, the court would already know that the officer
expected to find drugs on the premises. As mentioned previously,
objective facts will be presumed to inform the officer's intentions. In
this case, his knowledge of possible drugs is presumed to mean that
the officer wants to capture the drugs in the least burdensome way. If
the officer then creates an exigency without calling for a warrant first,
this presumption tells us that he did so only to circumvent the warrant
requirement.
The telephone warrant requirement offers another layer of
protection to the individual incurring the possible warrantless entry.
In addition to the objective measures suggested previously, requiring
police to call for a telephone warrant if possible is another objective
measure proscribing police officer conduct that could be taken with
bad intentions. Because those intentions are difficult to measure and
must be objectified, this requirement puts one more obstacle in the
way of an overzealous police officer intent on making a warrantless
entry.
CONCLUSION
As this Recent Development has argued, the Supreme Court
should grant certiorari to ensure that the exigent circumstance
exception to the warrant requirement is interpreted uniformly across
the circuits. Whether an officer, like the one in Mowatt, creates his
own exigency should not turn on whether his circuit uses
MacDonald's objective or Richard's subjective test to evaluate his
actions. As the Supreme Court seems to suggest, courts should not
inquire into the subjective intent of an individual officer. Instead, as
this Recent Development proposes, courts should measure his
awareness objectively and decide whether, given that awareness, he
manufactured the exigency. A presumption should exist that, where
objective measures show the officer is aware of drug activity in the
home, an announcement of law enforcement presence followed by a
warrantless entry into the home creates exigent circumstances,
namely the need to prevent evidence from being destroyed. This
presumption is rebuttable but only at the behest of the government
offering objective evidence evincing another exigency.
This compromise addresses only the narrow exigency of
destruction of evidence. The ready destructibility of narcotics should
not be used as a proxy to intrude into someone's home without a
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warrant. It is beyond the scope of this Recent Development to
propose a standard when other exigent circumstances are offered to
excuse warrantless action, namely, the officer's safety. One thing is
clear-an officer in one circuit should not be required to ignore the
smell of marijuana while her fellow officer in a neighboring circuit
can use that smell, knock and announce, and assert the possible
destruction of evidence as justification for her warrantless entry.
Until the Supreme Court specifies a single standard to determine
when police have manufactured their own exigency, officers in the
Fourth Circuit should consider themselves warned: don't act like you
smell pot before you announce yourself.
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